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The Obligation to Work* 
Lawrence C. Becker 
Many of the putative obligations of citizenship are nonvoluntary. The 
obligation to obey the law applies to children well before the law itself 
declares them capable of making enforceable, voluntary agreements. 
And every existing state enforces obligations on adults who never 
consented to those obligations -or even to any second-level procedure 
(such as majority rule or judicial review) which they imagined might 
produce such obligations. (I am not thinking here of the sweeping tacit 
agreements one might attribute to good-spirited, thoughtful, civic-
minded people. I am thinking instead of the more meager agreements 
we must be content with in the case of mean-spirited, shortsighted, 
resolute free riders. At least for them, it is true that many putative 
citizenship obligations are nonvoluntary.) My purpose here is to explore 
one such putative obligation: the obligation to do socially useful work. It 
is an interesting case because people who agree that work is a good thing 
differ sharply over whether it is a social obligation,l and people who 
agree that it is an obligation differ sharply and vehemently over whether 
the obligation to work should be enforced by law. I shall argue that work 
is a social obligation, but that the work requirement should not be 
enforced by law, except in cases where it counts as reciprocity for a 
special benefit. But I want to begin by describing a striking example of 
enforcement: the work obligation imposed by law in the Soviet Union. In 
addition to its intrinsic interest, the example provides a practical context 
against which to assess the theoretical arguments to follow. 
• An earlier version of this paper was read to the Philosophy Department Colloquium 
at Syracuse University. I am indebted to the members of that group for their criticisms and 
to John W. Atwell, Jr., Williams J. Evitts, David Longfellow, William B. Simons, and Jesse 
Zeldin for discussion and bibliographical help. 
1. By "obligation" I mean an act that is required, as opposed to one that is merely 
good or permitted. A "social" obligation is a requirement whose beneficiaries are all the 
members of the group which imposes the obligation: Alternatively, social obligations are 
requirements whose fulfillment produces (or contributes to) a public good-a good like 
clean air which, if available at all, is equally available to all. 
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PARASITE LAWS 
"Socially useful work" is a constitutional duty in the USSR. The 1936 
constitution put it as follows (in article 12): "Work in the U.S.S.R. is 
a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in 
accordance with the principle: 'He who does not work, neither shall he 
eat.' ... The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of socialism: 'From 
each according to his ability, to each according to his work.' "2 The new 
constitution puts it this way (in article 60): "Conscientious labor in one's 
chosen field of socially useful activity and observance of labor discipline 
is the duty and a matter of honor for every Soviet citizen who is able to 
work. Avoiding socially useful work is incompatible with the principles 
of a socialist society."3 And from article 14: "The labor of Soviet people, 
free from exploitation, is the source of the growth of public wealth and 
of the well-being of the people and of every Soviet citizen. . .. In 
accordance with the principle of socialism: 'From each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his work,' the state supervises performance 
and consumption." 
It should be noted, of course, that the Soviet constitution also 
contains a commitment to full employment: the right-to-work provision 
of article 40. In fact, quoting some other relevant passages helps to put 
the work obligation in context. For example, from article 13: "Property 
in the personal possession or use of citizens must not serve for the 
derivation of unearned income or be used to the detriment of the 
interests of society." From article 14 again: "Socially useful labor and its 
2. Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1936) 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969). This constitution is also reprinted in Jan F. Triska, 
ed., Constitutions of the Communist Party States (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, 
Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Press, 1968). Although a number of the 
documents in the Triska volume are out of date (e.g., the ones on Cuba and the USSR), 
and of course several nations (notably in Africa) have joined the list of Communist party 
states since 1968, it is nonetheless interesting to compare the constitutions with respect to 
work obligations. The duty to work is explicit in the constitutions of China (1954; article 
16), Bulgaria (1948; article 73), Hungary (1949; article 7), North Korea (1948; article 30), 
Poland (1952; article 14), and Rumania (1965; article 5). It is implicit in passages of the 
constitutions of Mongolia (1961; articles 17 and 89), Czechoslovakia (1960; article 13), and 
Yugoslavia (1963; articles 6,7, and 62). It does not seem to be in the Albanian constitution 
(1964). An updating of the Triska volume is scheduled for publication in the summer of 
1980 as William B. Simons, ed., The Constitutions of the Communist World (Alphen aan den 
Rijn, Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff). Simons has kindly supplied me with some 
of the newly translated texts. The duty to work is explicit in the new constitutions of China 
(1978; article 10), Albania (1977; article 44), North Korea (1972; article 69); Cuba (1975; 
article 44), Hungary (1972; sec. 14), Rumania (1965; article 5), Bulgaria (1971; article 59), 
and Poland (1976; article 19). It is implicit in the current constitutions of Czechoslovakia 
(1960; article 13) and Yugoslavia (1974; articles 159 and 195). 
3. Adopted October 7, 1977, published in Izvestia (October 8, 1977), pp. 3-6. The 
translated text quoted here is in Review of Socialist Law 4 (1978): 57-84. The translation is 
by F. J. M. Feldbrugge and William B. Simons. 
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results determine the position of man in society. The state, combining 
material and moral incentives, and encouraging inventiveness and a 
creative attitude to work, furthers the transformation of labor into the 
prime necessity oflife of every Soviet man and woman." From article 40: 
"Citizens of the USSR have the right to work, that is, to guaranteed 
employment with remuneration in accordance with the quantity and 
quality of the work, ... including the right to choose a profession, 
occupation, and work in accordance with their vocation, ability, voca-
tional training, and education, taking into account the needs of society." 
From article 41: "Citizens of the USSR have the right to rest." And from 
article 59: "The exercise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the 
performance by the citizen of his duties." Other constitutional duties of 
Soviet citizens include the duty to obey the law (article 59); to safeguard 
and strengthen socialist property (article 61); to help safeguard the state 
(article 62); to serve in the military (article 63); to respect the rights of 
others (article 65); to "show concern for the upbringing of children, to 
prepare them for socially useful labor, and to raise worthy members of a 
socialist society" (article 66); "to protect nature and safeguard its riches" 
(article 67); and "to promote the development of friendship and 
cooperation with the peoples of other countries and the maintenance 
and strengthening of world peace" (article 69). 
The general constitutional obligation to work has been im-
plemented in a number of ways, but perhaps the most notorious are the 
so-called parasite laws, versions of which were enacted in a number of 
the smaller Soviet republics in the late 1950s, and in the three largest 
republics in 1961. The version enacted in the Russian Republic 'soon 
became standard. It said, in part, "adult, able-bodied citizens who do not 
wish to perform a major constitutional duty -to work honestly according 
to their abilities-and who avoid socially useful work, derive unearned 
income from the exploitation of land plots, automobiles, or housing, or 
commit other antisocial acts which enable them to lead a parasitic way of 
life, shall be subject ... to resettlement in specially designated localities 
for a period of from two to five years, with confiscation of the property 
acquired by non-labor means, and to obligatory enlistment in work at the 
place of resettlement."4 Considerable interpretation of the law was 
necessary, of course. Its provisions were not applicable to spouses 
"working at home and raising children."5 (My sources were not clear 
about childless spouses working at home.) And people pensioned for 
reasons of age or poor health were exempt. Furthermore, though the 
law was specifically aimed at people living from "unearned income," the 
4. Quoted from Harold]. Berman, justice in the U.S.S.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1963), p. 292. The full text of the law is given here, on pp. 291-94. 
5. Ibid., p. 296. 
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definition of that term was tricky. It did not, for example, include the 
interest received from deposits in state savings banks.6 
Nonetheless, the law cast a wide net and was at first vigorously 
enforced. It was reported by the Soviet Minister of Justice that in the first 
year of the law's administration in Moscow ten thousand people were 
tried for parasitism. Eight thousand were given warnings and sent to 
work in Moscow. Two thousand were expelled from Moscow to enforced 
labor. 7 
I put all the foregoing in the past tense because, though parasite 
laws still exist in the Soviet Union, they have been modified considerably 
over the years. For example, parasitism in the Russian Republic is now 
simply a straightforward criminal offense (along with vagrancy), and the 
penalties have been changed from resettlement in a labor colony to 
"deprivation of freedom." Furthermore, the length of sentence has been 
reduced from two to five years to a maximum of one year (for a first 
offense) and a maximum of two years (for recidivists).8 Nonetheless, 
parasite laws remain an important means of enforcing the constitutional 
obligation to work in the Soviet Union. 
A GENERAL SOCIAL OBLIGATION TO WORK 
The questions I want to explore are, first, whether a general citizenship 
obligation to work can be justified and, second, whether such an 
obligation, once justified, ought to be enforced by law. These are 
uncomfortable questions for most citizens of the United States. Here, of 
course, there is no constitutional duty to work. In fact, the U.S. 
Constitution does not specifically enumerate a citizen's duties at all. It 
enumerates the powers of state and federal governments, powers which 
logically entail the existence ofliabilities of the form: "If the state makes 
6. See John N. Hazard, Communists and Their Law (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1969), p. 214. 
7. See Berman, p. 85, and George Feifer, Justice in Moscow (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1964), pp. 196-97. Feifer's chapter on the parasite law contains an interesting 
eyewitness account of a trial for parasitism. He maintains that most of the cases seem to 
involve pimps, prostitutes, alcoholics, and chronic offenders against labor discipline. But, 
of course, the law has been used against writers who are out of favor (e.g., Brodsky; see an 
English translation, by Collyer Bowen, of the transcript of his trial in "The Trial of Iosif 
Brodsky," New Leader [August 31,1964], pp. 6-17); and it is, in principle, aimed at the 
variety of ways of getting a little income "on the side," as described in Hedrick Smith's 
book, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle Books, New York Times Book Co., 1976), 
chap. 3. 
8. I am grateful to Williams B. Simons for providing me with the relevant English 
translations. See Review of Socialist Law 2 (1976): 262-63·, which reports changes in article 
209 of the criminal code of the Russian Republic of the USSR. See also Harold J. Berman, 
ed., Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: the RSFSR Codes, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1972), pp. 77-81. The Soviet Union is not the only socialist country to 
have (or have had) such laws. Simons has pointed out to me similar passages in the criminal 
codes of Hungary (1962; sec. 214) and Rumania (article 327). 
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a law ... then citizens have the duty to .... " And, of course, the rights 
granted to citizens clearly imply corresponding duties in everyone to 
respect those rights. But the only obligations explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution are those on governments and governmental officials. 
Furthermore, anything like the USSR's parasite law is politically un-
thinkable here. 
On the other hand, a "work ethic" has considerable power. Some 
opponents of welfare argue vigorously that work requirements should 
be made a condition for receipt of the benefits; and even opponents of 
such strings on welfare do not argue that people should not work if they 
are able. 
Nonetheless, people who are brought up, politically, on the liberal 
theory of justice are likely to find the parasite laws deeply offensive. One 
source of offense is the actual implementation of the laws in the Soviet 
Union: the regime of labor camps, the paternalistic methods of en-
forcement, and the occasional abuse of the laws to get at political 
dissidents. Another source is the conviction that work obligations should 
not be made a matter oflaw at all. So far, the general Western antipathy 
to these laws (which I certainly share) seems unremarkable. 
But another source of offense is clearly regrettable: the unreflective 
bias against certain citizenship obligations-work being among them-
that liberalism tends to produce. Liberalism teaches that there is some-
thing natural, fundamental, and inescapable about people's right to 
liberty. Consequently, the duty to respect others' liberties (though 
derivative) is equally natural and inescapable. But an obligation to work 
for the benefit of others is seen as artificial rather than natural and as 
something which - if it can ever be justified at all-must be subordinate 
to the demands of liberty. 
This is a simple non sequitur. It must be granted that non voluntary 
obligations to pay taxes and to do socially useful work are artificial, that 
is, that their moral basis lies in the ongoing human artifacts known as 
social institutions rather than in an imaginary state of nature. But it does 
not follow that their justification is any more difficult than the justifica-
tion of the (equal) right to liberty or that they must be subordinate to 
liberty. 
The Reciprocity Argument 
I wish to argue that there is at least one non voluntary social obligation, 
namely, reciprocity: the obligation to make a proportional return of 
good for a good received. In outline, the argument runs as follows. 9 
No one is self-made. Whatever good there is in our lives is, in part, a 
product of the acts of others. Moreover, it is also the product of others' 
fulfilling their putative social obligations: obligations of restraint (such as 
9. See my "Reciprocity and Social Obligations," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1980), 
in press. 
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are found in the criminal laws against murder and theft), of care (as 
found in the law of negligence), of effort ("trying" to help), or of 
contribution (paying taxes). 
All the standard theories of justice support a requirement (obliga-
tion) of reciprocity, that is, a proportional return of good for good. 
(Returning bad for bad is a more complex problem and may be ignored 
here.)lO Such a practice has obvious social utility and would be adopted 
by utilitarians either as a rule or as part of a "role."ll A society in which 
people returned good for good seems likely to be preferred by rational 
contractors to one which differed only in the respect that reciprocity was 
not observed. And the concept of reciprocity seems embedded in natural 
rights theory as well, for example, in the reciprocal relationship between 
rights and obligations. (When I respect your right to liberty, you must 
respect mine. When I invade your right, you may invade mine to protect 
yours.) 
Fulfilling the requirement of reciprocity sometimes involves meet-
ing the demands of one's benefactors because sometimes only that will 
count as a "fitting and proportional" return of good for good. (Think of 
a friend asking for a favor in return for past good deeds: "No, I don't 
want the money back. What I need is the use of your car for the day.") 
Citizenship obligations may be thought of as the institutionalized de-
mands of our benefactors for reciprocity. Thus, an important class of 
non voluntary social obligations is justified. 
Now, of course, there are severe limits to the obligations which can 
be so established. In particular, the requirement here is only that we 
return good for good and then only in proportion to the good received. 
Thus, we need not reciprocate for malicious acts which accidentally 
produce good (unless it is by being ineptly malicious in return). And we 
need not reciprocate for the "good" done by speculators in recipro-
city-people who shower us with unwanted benefits to put us in their 
debt. At least, to the extent that such speculation is a bad thing, we need 
not return good for it. The requirement of reciprocity is not strong 
enough to justify Christian charity. In short, although there are interest-
ing complications left to be explored, the reciprocity argument, as I shall 
call it, is a promising avenue for the justification of nonvoluntary 
citizenship obligations. For the sake of the argument to follow, I shall 
simply assume that it is sound. 
10. See Plato, Republic, bk. I at 335. And for a recent discussion, see Joel Kidder, 
"Requital and Criminal Justice," International Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1975): 255-78. 
II. In order to promote the goods derivable only from habit, reflex, spontaneous 
emotion, and cooperative action (in, e.g., prisoner's dilemma situations), even the most 
thoroughgoing act-utilitarian must cultivate traits of character which foreclose rational 
calculation in certain circumstances. (Think of the reflexes needed to drive a car well.) It is 
my contention that the propensity to reciprocate is among the "non calculative" dispositions 
the utilitarian must cultivate. See my "The Priority of Human Interests," unpublished 
manuscript. 
Becker The Obligation to Work 41 
The question then becomes whether it is possible to derive a general 
work obligation from the requirement of reciprocity. By a "general" 
obligation, I mean a non voluntary obligation which applies "generally" 
or "equally" across the whole class of members of society. And in one 
sense of 'equal obligation' this is obviously impossible. Obligations must 
be scaled to competence, ability, and benefits. 12 People differ widely 
along those three dimensions, so widely that it is obvious that it would be 
impossible to justify any proposal to require the same work from 
everyone. (Similarly, it would be unreasonable to require everyone to 
pay the same dollar amount of taxes.) 
But I shall use another sense of equal obligation here, one which 
makes it clear that a work obligation could in principle apply equally to 
all members of society. I shall say that work obligations are equal if, after 
they are scaled to competence, ability, and benefits, they apply to 
everyone. Thus, all members of a society may be said to be equally 
obligated to work even though the quality and quantity of required work 
varies widely from member to member. 
The question now is whether there is any reason to conclude that 
people do have a social obligation to work. Here, two things can be 
shown: first, that the form of a justification is easily available, but that, 
second, whether the form can be filled in and applied to a given society 
depends on contingent truths about that society. As a result, it is not 
possible to show, from purely conceptual considerations alone, that an 
equal obligation to work exists. The best one can do is to establish a 
presumption in favor of it. 
The form of a justification is not difficult to see, once the require-
ment of reciprocity is granted. Each of us is the product, in part, of the 
work done by others, work which creates an environment in which 
whatever happiness we have is possible. It is true that we did not ask to 
be born; we did not (at least at first) intentionally make demands on 
others; we did not invite the nourishment they gave and continue to give 
us. But it is also true that most of our benefactors had no part in bringing 
us into their midst. Yet their work continues to benefit us, whether they 
like it or not. 
I have assumed that reciprocity is required for the good provided to 
us by the restraint, care, efforts, and contributions of others. Reciprocity 
requires the return of benefits which are fitting and proportional to the 
ones received. When the benefits we receive come from the work others 
do-rather than just from their restraint or carefulness-a purely 
12. If it is unjustifiable to require people to do things that they are unable to do, then 
obligations can only be imposed on the "competent," and then only to a degree 
commensurate with their ability to perform. Hence the necessity for scaling obligations to 
competence and ability. Furthermore, since my arguments here are based only on the 
assumption that one is required to reciprocate-to make a proportional return of good for 
good received -obligations must be scaled to benefits received as well. 
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passive response from us (i.e., restraint or care) may not be fitting or 
proportional to the benefits we have received. Work may have to be 
reciprocated by work. This is one source of a general social obligation to 
work, which can, in principle, be institutionalized as a citizenship 
obligation. 
Here is another source: Each of us is a burden on others. Our mere 
existence diminishes natural resources; we pollute; we consume the time 
and energy of those who have to deal with us. We are a net burden on 
others if we do not make an offsetting contribution to their welfare. 
Now, it is a fact that some people do make an effort to offset these 
burdens and succeed in offsetting them. Reciprocity to them is as much 
in order as it is for people who produce "positive" good for us. And 
reciprocity here may also require a contribution produced by effort. 
Obligations based on the reciprocity argument are in principle 
directed only to one's benefactors, a set of people which need not be 
coextensive with society, or the nation, or the family as a whole. Yet 
social obligations, as defined at the outset, are those whose beneficiaries 
"of record" are all the members of the group. So how is it that the 
reciprocity argument can create a social obligation? 
There are two ways. For one thing, some goods are not partitiona-
ble; they are public goods-goods which, if they are available at all, are 
equally available to everyone. If the requirement of reciprocity yields an 
obligation to produce or contribute to the production of a public good, 
then it has yielded what is in effect a social obligation. But more 
importantly, reciprocity may require compliance with the demands of 
one's benefactors, demands institutionalized as membership obligations 
designed by one's benefactors to benefit all members. Hence, reciprocity 
may yield social obligations directly, as well as obligations which are 
merely inescapably social ones "in effect." 
Showing how an equal work obligation might be justified does not 
take us very far, however. What we want to know is whether such a social 
obligation is justified - here and now. More generally, we want to know 
when work is the form of reciprocity which can be required of us. One 
obvious answer is that when reciprocity is required, and when work is the 
only way reciprocity can be given, then work is required. But when is 
that the case? When is it that nothing but work will do? Here, a purely 
conceptual analysis fails to yield detailed guidance, because so much 
depends on empirical findings about existing social conditions. But a few 
things of interest can be said. For one thing, the justifiability of 
producing various social goods is a logically prior question. It may have 
been evident to the Soviets that in order to achieve the goals of rapid 
industrialization, a stable socialist economy, and an improved standard 
ofliving for all, work would have to be made a citizenship obligation. But 
the logically prior question is whether it is justifiable to require people to 
contribute to producing those social goods. 
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Second, after the social goals are decided, one needs to know 
whether work from everyone is needed or just needed from a subset of 
the population. If it is just the latter, then the general work obligation 
could at most be a conditional one, similar to the obligation to serve in 
the military. If more workers are needed (due to a lack of volunteers or a 
temporary crisis), then a work obligation may be imposed. 
Finally, before a general work obligation is imposed, the question of 
acceptable substitutes for work must be carefully considered. Even if a 
given quantity of political party activity is a social necessity, and even if 
an obligation to produce such activity falls equally on all citizens, it does 
not quite follow that the obligation must actually be to work in party 
politics. Money contributions might be an acceptable substitute. Some of 
the relevant concerns here are simply about efficiency: Can the job be 
done if some people offer only substitutes for work? Can the job be done 
well if they offer substitutes? Will there be a net loss of social good if they 
do so? And so on. 
But there are questions of fairness and fittingness here too. Just as it 
is inappropriate (unfitting) to make a cash payment in place of returning 
a friend's dinner invitation, so too it may sometimes be unfitting to buy 
one's way out of socially useful work. And it may even be unfair, as when 
the wealthy were once permitted to buy their way out of the draft, 
effectively shifting the risks of war inequitably onto the poor. 
Beyond these very general remarks, however, I cannot deduce any 
further guidance on when a social obligation to work is justifiable. To get 
conclusions about specific obligations, specific social conditions will have 
to be considered in detail. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that a 
general obligation to do socially useful work is justifiable in the case of 
contemporary, "developed" societies. So much work is required to keep 
them going, and we all profit so much from the work of others in these 
societies, that it certainly seems reasonable to put the burden of proof on 
people who claim that they themselves (or any others they mention) have 
no obligation to work. People who are able to work, and do not work, are 
parasites, however unattractive and emotionally loaded that label is. 
People in this society all live, in part, off the labor of others. And there is 
a chronic oversupply of jobs which need to be done to sustain and 
improve the quality of life for us all. (I am not speaking here of simply 
income-producing jobs.) So reciprocity in the form of work seems not 
only appropriate but necessary in our present circumstances. At least, it 
seems reasonable to adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of the 
obligation to work. 
THE EQUAL-WORK OBLIGATION SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED 
BYLAW 
Even so, however, it can be shown that a general social obligation to work 
ought not to be enforced legally. Parasite laws are unjustifiable. This 
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follows directly from two things: first, the moral requirements of 
certainty and advance notice within the law and, second, our inability to 
define a general work obligation precisely enough to conform to these 
moral requirements. 
I shall consider the relevant problems of definition first. For one 
thing, it is notoriously difficult to distinguish work from other human 
activities. By any definition, I suppose, work of the sort that concerns us 
here is positive effort, rather than mere self-restraint, or being careful, 
or making a contribution. It is also sustained effort, rather than 
momentary exertion. Furthermore, the sustained effort must be con-
sciously directed at accomplishing tasks, in the sense that it is designed to 
yield a "product" over and above the satisfactions derived from the 
activity (sustained effort) itself.13 Play, for example, as distinguished 
from competitive sports and physical conditioning, is not typically aimed 
at a product other than the pleasures of the moment. 
So work is sustained, purposively productive effort. But it is clear 
that every element of this definition can be subjected to destructive 
analysis. Problematic borderline cases can be produced in great num-
bers. Is personal grooming work? Trying to go to sleep? Making a 
peanut butter sandwich? All of these activities-and many more like 
them -appear to fit the definition of work, at least under some imagina-
ble conditions. 
Clarifying what counts as socially benr1icial work is not easy either. It 
is analytic, of course, that work required (by a social obligation) must be 
socially beneficial-at least potentially. Otherwise, the point of requiring 
it as a social obligation evaporates. (A social obligation is one whose 
beneficiaries of record are all the members of the [relevant] group.) 
The requirement of social beneficiality, however, produces another 
definitional muddle. The requirement means, obviously enough, that 
productive efforts which are purely self-regarding in value do not 
qualify. But it also means that productive efforts of value to only a subset 
of the relevant group do not qualify. The social benefits of one's work 
can be very indirect, of course (as is the case with good philosophy); but 
if society at large realizes no benefits at all from one's work, then that 
work cannot satisfy a social obligation to work. The definitional problem 
here is just that it is hard to think of any work at all which is entirely 
without some potential for some indirect social value. The problem is 
analogous to the difficulty of finding examples of purely self-regarding 
acts. Even purely private pleasures may make people happier, saner, 
better citizens. 
13. The Oxford English Dictionary devotes some nine pages to the word "work," but its 
relevant definition there is very close to the one I offer here. The notion of sustained effort 
is missing in the OED, but is present in some other dictionaries-e.g., Webster's Third 
International Dictionary. Both the noun and the verb are contrasted with the corresponding 
forms of the word "play," but the dictionaries do not give a definition of play which is 
useful for my purposes. 
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So what is the cash value of the requirement that work be socially 
beneficial? It must not be confused with claims that all the work one does 
be socially beneficial, or that any of it be the most beneficial work one can 
do. Neither of these claims is analytic to the notion of a social obligation 
to work. 
Further, it is clear that the social benefit requirement does not entail 
that one's work be income producing (at least in the usual sense of 
income). This is so because sometimes the market cannot or does not pay 
for all the work society can justifiably require of its citizens. (Think of all 
the work women have traditionally been required to do in the home.) 
And sometimes an economy is designed to require a certain level of 
unemployment. Where this is so, we can hardly hold that everyone is 
morally obligated to do income-producing work. 
In short, the requirement that work be socially beneficial merely 
rules out devoting oneself exclusively to labor with purely "subsocial" 
value and labor which has net negative or neutral social value. But what 
will count as positive social value is in principle so wide ranging that 
practically nothing of any importance follows from the bare idea. 
Concrete conclusions about social benefits depend heavily on empirical 
details about the sort of society at issue. Is it a market economy? A 
nonindustrial society? What are its needs? What do its members do? 
Further, a mere showing that our work yields some social benefits 
will not show that it satisfies our social obligation to work. There is still 
the question of the amount of work required. And that raises further 
definitional problems about which very little of interest can be said on 
this purely conceptual level. 
Consider: Incompetence yields an exemption from work obliga-
tions. 14 And competent workers differ in both their ability to work and 
the level of benefits they have received from society. Equal work 
obligations, as defined here, must be scaled to all three factors. 
Consequently, once competence to work has been established, the 
ability and benefit principles, taken together, will set a ceiling on the 
amount of work which can justifiably be required. And that ceiling will 
be set by the lower of the two relevant figures: No matter how high one's 
abilities, work out of proportion to benefits received (i.e., "above" those 
benefits) cannot be required. Similarly, no matter how high one's 
benefits, work beyond one's abilities cannot be required. 
Now when one is dealing with taxable income, one can confidently 
make some rough judgments about these matters. But in the case of 
work, such judgments (about levels of ability and benefits) are much 
more problematic. I do not say that reasonable rough assessments are 
14. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that incompetence with respect to 
some sorts of work does not necessarily exempt people from all work obligations. And if 
people are competent to learn to work, they may be obligated to do that first, in order to be ' 
obligated to work. 
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impossible, just that they are very problematic. This adds to the problem 
of getting a precise definition of people's work obligations. 
Even granting a solution to the foregoing problems does not get one 
out of the woods, however. The requirable level of work may be reduced 
still further by the level of social need. And that is an empirical issue. 
Given high technology, a stable social situation, and abundant labor, it 
may be possible to require only a low level of work. No matter what the 
level of social need, however, an increase in work obligations which 
violates the benefit and ability principles cannot be justified. 
Against Parasite Laws 
The consequence of all of these definitional problems, when they are 
combined with standard requirements of justice, is that the direct legal 
enforcement of a general work obligation is unjustifiable. Parasite laws 
immediately become embroiled in complex issues of substantive and 
procedural justice-issues which, given the indeterminacy of the defini-
tion of the nature and amount of socially useful work, present over-
whelming objections to the administration of these laws. 
Consider: All of our general remarks about the nature of work 
obligations still do not yield much in the way of concrete answers to the 
question, What counts toward the satisfaction of one's obligation to 
work? So much depends on existing social needs, individual competence, 
benefits, and abilities, and on what benefits it is reasonable to expect 
from a given activity, that drawing up a very specific or complete list a 
priori is out of the question. One can rule out most of the things we 
define as crime and rule in most of the job niches in a modern economy, 
but that exercise is neither very interesting nor very useful. This very 
indeterminacy figures importantly in arguments about enforcement, 
however. 
Since a priori list making is rather pointless, the proper approach 
seems to be to adopt a sweeping but rebuttable presumption in favor of 
the adequacy (for meeting one's work obligations) of all of the commonly 
recognized "occupations."15 Disallowing any of these would then require 
argument; allowing novel occupations would also require argument; but 
without reason to the contrary, allowing any of the commonly recog-
nized occupations would not need argument. This too has consequences 
for enforcement. 
Specifically, all the indeterminacy in the notion of socially useful 
work appears to defeat two requirements of justice in the administration 
of the law: certainty and advance notice. Since the direct imposition of 
sanctions on delinquents inevitably compromises their liberty, one is 
15. For convenience, "commonly recognized occupations" might be defined as the 
ones acceptable on official documents which require people to name their occupations. 
"Thinker" is presumably not acceptable; "philosopher" is problematic; "philosophy 
professor" is clearly acceptable. 
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under a stringent duty of care to see to it that the sanctions are 
justifiable. This involves being able to identify all and only those who are 
delinquent and to give people adequate advance notice of what will 
count as delinquency. 
Consider: Selective enforcement of the law violates the principle of 
formal equality. Similar cases must be treated similarly. If one operates 
with an incomplete list of ways to meet and to fail to meet the work 
obligation, and then engages in affirmative efforts to find and prosecute 
delinquents, the result is inevitably a violation of formal equality. Some 
delinquents will "get by" just because no one had thought to put them on 
the list. Yet getting a complete list of "approved" occupations is an 
enormous task for any complex, industrial society. 
Second, the imposition of criminal or civil penalties of the sort we 
are considering is generally agreed to require advance notice to potential 
offenders. This is another reason that a complete list is important. We 
can, of course, refuse to penalize people ex post facto and just keep 
adding to the list as novel cases come up. But this does not give people 
much assurance about what else might, in the future, be proscribed. 
Now, the law often has to deal with concepts which are fuzzy along 
the borders. "Reasonable care" is a good example. So is competence. 
H. L. A. Hart is fond of remarking about such borderline problems 
(roughly) that in order to have problematic borderline cases you first 
have to have borderlines. And in many areas of the law, knowing those 
borderlines will settle the vast majority of cases. Accordingly, the 
requirements of certainty and advance notice-especially in tort law-
are often compromised. 
If defining a general work obligation only presented us with one 
more such problem, a similar compromise would be possible in the case 
of parasite laws. But the truth is that the concept of socially useful work 
is not just fuzzy around the edges. It is fuzzy through and through. 
Consequently, the hard cases-the ones which involve morally objec-
tionable compromises with the requirements of certainty and advance 
notice-will not just be confined to a small percentage of bizarre events 
around the fringes. Hard cases are likely to dominate the field. Unless a 
convincing argument can be made for tolerating the quantity of com-
promise (with respect to justice) that this would entail, direct legal 
enforcement of a general obligation to work cannot be justified. I cannot 
construct such an argument. So I oppose the enactment of parasite laws. 
WORK REQUIREMENTS ON SPECIAL BENEFITS 
"Special," as opposed to general, work obligations are a different matter, 
however. Attaching work requirements to socially provided special 
benefits does not present the same moral problems. In the first place, the 
state is not engaged here in affirmative efforts to find and penalize 
delinquents. So the urgency of having a complete list of approved 
occupations is significantly diminished. 
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Second, attaching the requirements only to special benefits-that is, 
to those partitionable benefits provided only upon request-reduces the 
problem further. It is true that the general, nonpartitionable benefits we 
all receive from society (such as a stable monetary system) are difficult to 
attach to a hard and fast list of work obligations. Must I serve in the 
military to reciprocate for the benefits of national defense? Probably 
not-at least not in this country, now. But will being a full-time parent 
count? It is hard to say. Special benefits, however, are not so difficult to 
analyze. For example, suppose I request a special, low-interest loan from 
the government to help me rebuild my business after tornado damage. 
We are perfectly accustomed to asking for income-producing work in 
return-not only so that the loan can be repaid, but also so that its 
purpose (to stimulate business) can be fulfilled. And we are willing to 
make the guarantee of such work a condition of the loan. 
Or suppose I ask for a zoning change for some land I own, a change 
which will benefit me but impose costs on others. Here we are still in the 
process of finding suitable general guidelines, but the principle is clear: I 
can justifiably be required to reduce others' costs to a minimum and/or 
to offset them with other, similar benefits. (If I have to cut down all the 
existing trees on my lot to build my building, it may be appropriate to 
require me to plant some trees. And so on.) 
Or suppose I ask for income (or consumer goods) from the state. 
Surely it is no less reasonable here to attach conditions to receipt of the 
benefits-and at least one condition appropriate to these particular 
benefits is the undertaking to do income-producing work. This is 
appropriate not only so that the need for these special benefits can be 
reduced, but also because earning taxable income is reciprocation in 
kind for the benefits received. Reciprocity in kind is not the only 
appropriate sort, but it is an appropriate sort. 
Work requirements must be scaled by the competence and ability 
principles. And in the case of income-producing work, that means that 
such work must be available-and at a reasonable cost to the individual. 
It is obviously not justifiable to refuse medical benefits to people with 
heart disease because they will not take outdoor jobs in severe cold. 
Similarly, parents cannot justifiably be asked to take jobs which destroy 
their ability to care for their children. The details in each case are 
complicated, but the principle is reasonably clear. When special benefits 
are sought-benefits produced by the work of others-an obligation to 
reciprocate in kind can usually be defined with enough precision to 
make its just enforcement by law at least possible. 
It may be objected that there is something underhanded in all of 
this. First, we trot out examples of business loans and zoning problems 
and describe them as cases of imposing a special work obligation. That is 
unusual; we do not usually think of them that way. But then try to force 
an analogy between business loans and welfare payments-and merely 
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to assert without argument that income-producing work obligations are 
as justifiable for the latter as for the former-is highly suspect. It looks 
too much like the reaction of someone who simply begrudges an 
obligation to help the needy and is trying to find a way to "make them 
pay" after all. 
The fact that tying work requirements to special benefits looks 
punitive with respect to the poor is due, I think, to three things. First, we 
know that some of the people who have proposed work requirements for 
welfare recipients have, in fact, been opponents of welfare, or at least 
grudging enough about it to insist on work as a way of venting their 
hostility to the whole system. Second, as I mentioned earlier, liberalism 
has left a legacy of repugnance toward direct interference with daily life, 
and work requirements (as opposed to taxes, e.g.) seem particularly 
direct-almost physically invasive of one's person. Finally, the poor are a 
suspect class. That is, they have been systematically and unjustly harmed 
often enough in the past to place an especially stringent standard of 
proof on anyone who proposes to place more burdens on them. 
All of this I acknowledge. But motives should not be confused with 
arguments, and a prejudice against work obligations per se is regrettable 
for reasons I have already given. The serious problem is whether there is 
a good argument for special work obligations. 
Here I admit that the case I have made is a rather weak one. 
Essentially, all I have shown is that attaching work obligations to special 
benefits is not unusual (we do it in a variety of cases quite far removed 
from welfare), and that it is at least in principle appropriate in all these 
cases, including welfare. To show more than that-to show, for example, 
that an income-producing work requirement should actually be imposed 
on welfare recipients -I would have to canvass the possible alternatives 
(including non-income-producing work) and show that such a require-
ment was the best. I have not done that, and I cannot at present do it. 
Changing the welfare system was not my concern in writing this 
essay, however. My purpose was simply to establish the general justifia-
bility of an obligation to do socially useful work and to show where that 
might lead. In that regard, it is perhaps appropriate to close by 
mentioning that an effective system of work obligations, like any other 
citizenship obligation, requires more than enforcement measures. It also 
requires the acceptance, on the part of citizens, that they are obligated. 
(Otherwise, the costs of effective enforcement are prohibitive.) With 
regard to moral suasion, then, if it is true-as I think it is-that 
revolutionary socialist systems are unbearably paternalistic and meddle-
some, it is also true that we are regrettably diffident. 
